Changed readme.md

readme.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ The project strictly follows a Domain-Driven / Clean Architecture (Ports & Adapt
     * Implements the interfaces defined in the Domain layer.
     * **Rule:** Entities never leak into the API layer.
 
-*Note: Future implementations will include ArchUnit tests to automatically enforce these architectural boundaries during the CI pipeline.*
+Architectural boundaries are enforced via ArchUnit (`src/test/java/auth_service/architecture/ArchitectureTest.java`), which runs as part of the standard `./mvnw test` quality gate. Abstract test bases live under `auth_service.shared.test` (`AbstractUnitTest`, `AbstractIntegrationTest`, `AbstractPersistenceTest`, `AbstractWebMvcTest`, `AbstractArchitectureTest`).
 
 ## ⚙️ Local Development
 
@@ -79,4 +79,25 @@ Metrics and health checks are exposed out-of-the-box via Spring Boot Actuator:
 
 Health: http://localhost:8080/actuator/health
 
-Prometheus Metrics: http://localhost:8080/actuator/prometheus
+Prometheus Metrics: http://localhost:8080/actuator/prometheus
+
+## 🗺️ Roadmap / Open Topics
+
+Tracking known work that is not yet implemented. Each item is independently actionable.
+
+### Security
+
+- **Switch JWT signing from HS256 → EdDSA (Ed25519).** Today Auth and Core share a symmetric `JWT_SECRET`, which means a Core compromise lets an attacker forge tokens. Move to an asymmetric keypair: Auth holds the private key and signs, Core only holds the public key and verifies. `jjwt 0.13` supports this via `Jwts.SIG.EdDSA`; JDK 25 has native `Ed25519` `KeyFactory`. Touches `JwtService`, `JwtConfig`, `application.yml`, `JwtServiceTest`, and the deployment env vars (`JWT_PRIVATE_KEY`, `JWT_PUBLIC_KEY` replace `JWT_SECRET`). Add a `kid` header so future rotation is possible.
+- **Refresh-token rotation.** Current access tokens last 24h with no revocation path. Split into a short-lived (5–15 min) access token and a long-lived (7–30 day) refresh token, rotated on every use, persisted server-side so logout / password change / "log out everywhere" actually revoke. Add a `token_version` column on `users` (or a `jti` blacklist table) checked on each refresh.
+- **Move JWT delivery to an httpOnly `Secure` cookie.** Tokens are currently returned in the response body and stored by the frontend in `localStorage`, exposing them to any XSS payload. Set the cookie server-side, scope it to `.tbp.andreas-dahm.eu`, and add CSRF protection (Spring Security's `CookieCsrfTokenRepository.withHttpOnlyFalse()`).
+- **Tighten CORS for cookie auth.** Restrict allowed origins to `https://tbp.andreas-dahm.eu` (plus the local dev origin) and set `allowCredentials=true`. Required before switching to cookie-based JWT.
+- **Rate-limit `/api/auth/login` and `/api/registration/**`.** Currently no brake on credential stuffing or registration spam. Bucket4j or Spring Security's built-in `RateLimiter` are both options; key by IP + email.
+
+### Observability and API
+
+- **Publish a JWKS endpoint** (`GET /.well-known/jwks.json`) once on EdDSA. Lets Core (and any future verifier) fetch the public key automatically and supports key rotation without redeploying every consumer.
+- **API versioning review.** Query-parameter versioning (`?v=1`) is unusual; path- or `Accept`-header-based versioning is more conventional and plays better with HTTP caches. Worth a deliberate decision before more endpoints accumulate.
+
+### Testing
+
+- The abstract test bases under `auth_service.shared.test` already cover unit / integration / persistence / WebMvc slices. Continue adding controller-level `AbstractWebMvcTest` coverage for any new endpoint and persistence-layer tests for any new repository.