To Be Played – Auth Service

Identity service of To Be Played, a Steam backlog tracker. It handles registration, login, user settings and the public profile, and it signs the JWTs that the Core service trusts.

To Be Played is split into three repositories:

Repository	Role
ToBePlayed-Auth (this one)	Users, login, settings, platform messages (hints, mail, news), signs JWTs
ToBePlayed-Core	Steam library, backlog, wishlist, stats; verifies JWTs
ToBePlayed-Frontend	React single-page app

Features

• Registration by email confirmation (a single-use link, valid 24 hours, on whose page the owner chooses the password; unconfirmed requests are deleted after 7 days) and then admin approval, login with email and password (BCrypt). Emails are stored trimmed and in lower case (V19, unique on lower(email)); a password has 8 characters and at most 72 bytes (BCrypt's limit).
• Password reset: "forgot password" mails a link (/reset-password#<token>, single use, valid 1 hour, only the SHA-256 stored, a new mail replaces the old link). Only an ACTIVE user gets a working link; every other address gets the same 204 and no mail. A reset ends all logins; "change password" (current password + new one) ends all logins but the current one. A PLATFORM_ADMIN can send the same mail to an active user. Both send a "password changed" mail.
• Brute-force protection in memory: 5 failed logins per email or 20 per IP, and 10 failed or 3 taken registrations per IP, block for 15 minutes with 429 TOO_MANY_ATTEMPTS and Retry-After. Unknown emails cost the same BCrypt time as a wrong password, and every failed login gets the same error.
• JWT signed with EdDSA (Ed25519). Auth holds the private key, Core only the public key, so Core can verify tokens but never create them. Tokens carry a kid header, and GET /.well-known/jwks.json publishes the public key as a JWK, so Core finds the right key after a rotation.
• Session in two HttpOnly cookies, so no script on the page can read a token. The access token lives 15 minutes in tbp_access (sent to Auth and Core). The refresh token is random, lives 30 days from its last use in tbp_refresh (sent to /api/auth only) and is stored only as a SHA-256 hash. Each refresh replaces it; a replaced token that comes back revokes all tokens of that login. Logout revokes them too.
• CSRF guard: POST, PUT and DELETE need an X-TBP-Client or Authorization header, and CORS allows only the frontend origin. A Bearer header still works for API clients and tests.
• User settings: display name (unique, case-insensitive), language, dark mode.
• Steam account linked through "Sign in through Steam" (Steam OpenID 2.0, no API key), never typed in. Steam proves the SteamID64, and Auth asks Steam to confirm the answer (check_authentication) before it stores the ID as verified. A one-time state plus a binding cookie tie the answer to the browser that started the link, so a foreign Steam login link cannot move someone's Steam ID into another account. IDs typed in before this stay, but unverified: a verified link from another account takes them away. Unlinking is possible.
• Appearance settings synced across devices: accent color, corner style, wide layout, reduce animations, background and dashboard banner from the user's own game art. Only whitelisted presets and Steam app ids are stored, never raw CSS or URLs.
• Opt-in public profile at /u/<display name>. Auth answers with a short-lived profile ticket (EdDSA JWT, 10 minutes, typ=public-profile) that Core accepts for the public library data only. The profile has its own look (accent, corners, banner and background from own game art) and a tile layout (profile_tiles: the shown tiles in order, each with a size S, M or L), apart from the app appearance; the public answer sends both as style. The ticket also names the user's role, so Core can show the free looks of an admin. The ticket's claims come from the layout: sections names the shown parts (STATS when any STATS_ tile is shown), profileStats the stat groups of the STATS_ tiles. The user's dashboard layout (dashboard_tiles, NULL = never changed) is stored the same way. The ticket is not a login: every token names its kind in aud (tbp-login, tbp-public-profile, tbp-internal, iss=tbp-auth), and both services check it. A login's sub is the user id; the email is in no token. A token without aud is refused. The claims are pinned in src/test/resources/contract/auth-core-contract.json, the same file as in Core (ToBePlayed-Deployment/scripts/check-contract.sh compares both).
• Errors: every error answer of a controller has the body {code, message} (a 401 or 403 of the security filters has none); a refused request is 400 VALIDATION_FAILED with fields, a duplicate email or display name 409 EMAIL_ALREADY_IN_USE / DISPLAY_NAME_ALREADY_IN_USE, anything unexpected 500 INTERNAL_ERROR without details (shared/api/GlobalExceptionController).
• Roles: one per user, a ladder USER < AUDITOR < PLATFORM_ADMIN (users.role, the first admin is set by SQL). The access token carries the active role in the role claim. View as: an admin switches the own login down to USER or AUDITOR and back (POST /api/auth/view-as); the choice is stored per login in refresh_tokens.active_role and never goes above the stored role, so a demoted admin loses the rights at the next refresh. Core checks the same claim. Role change: an admin sets the role of another user on the admin users page (PUT /api/admin/users/{id}/role). The change is a row in role_change (actor, old and new role, time; shown in the "Roles" dialog) and in admin_audit (ROLE_CHANGE), sets users.role_changed_at and clears "view as" of the open logins. An access token issued before role_changed_at counts as not logged in (401) at Auth and at Core, within 30 s (cache TTL); the frontend then refreshes and repeats the request, and the refresh reads the stored role. A role set by SQL (the first admin) sets no role_changed_at; it works from the next refresh. There is never 0 admins: every write that can remove an admin first locks the active admins (shared/account/ActiveAdmins, SELECT ... FOR UPDATE), the actor must still be one of them, and the last admin cannot delete the own account.
• Role markers on services: every service method a controller calls carries @RequiresRole(Role.X) or @Public, on the method or on its class (the method wins). A Spring Security method interceptor checks the active role while a request is served (scheduled jobs and @Async work run without a user and are not checked); a denied call answers 401 without a login, else 403. @Public skips only the role check: login, refresh, "view as" and the Steam callback prove the caller themselves. The URL rules in SecurityConfig stay as the outer guard. ArchUnit fails the build for an unmarked method, two markers, a controller calling an @Async method, and a service method calling another service's method that needs more.
• Admin users page (/api/admin/**, active role PLATFORM_ADMIN): search and page all users, block and unblock (users.enabled; blocking ends every login and, within 30 s, the access token at Auth and at Core; the login then answers 403 ACCOUNT_BLOCKED, but only after the right password), delete (the same flag and nightly cleanup as "Delete my account"). No action on the own account or on another admin. Every action and every "view as" is a row in admin_audit. Accept or deny an account that waits (users.status PENDING; the login answers 403 ACCOUNT_PENDING after the right password): accept makes it ACTIVE and mails "your account is active"; deny makes it DENIED, mails the user and sets deleted_at, so the login answers like a deleted account and the nightly cleanup removes it after 30 days. A waiting account cannot be blocked or deleted. Pending and denied users are nowhere public (shared/account/ActiveUser).
• Dashboard hints: a PLATFORM_ADMIN writes a hint for all users (plain text in English, German optional, start and end time, type DISMISS or ACCEPT). The dashboard shows the running hints one at a time, newest first. "Do not show again" on a DISMISS hint or "OK" on an ACCEPT hint is a row in hint_done, so the hint never comes back for this user on any device. Creating and ending a hint are rows in admin_audit. A hint can target groups, combined with AND (none = all users): without Steam, role (this role and higher, by the active role of the token), new users (users.registration_date less than N days ago), empty library (Auth only sends a flag; the Frontend checks it with Core). The text may use **bold** and [text](url); the Frontend renders it, never as HTML. Four automatic hints (NO_STEAM, EMPTY_LIBRARY, PILE_GREW, LINK_QUEUE) are on by default; a PLATFORM_ADMIN turns each on or off (auto_hint, audited). GET /api/hints lists the keys that are on and not hidden for the user; the Frontend checks the conditions. X hides one for 7 days, "Do not show again" for good (auto_hint_hidden).
• What's new: a PLATFORM_ADMIN publishes news entries (plain text, English, German optional; edit and delete, no drafts). The dashboard shows the entries published after user_settings.news_seen_at once in a dialog; "Got it" sets the stamp to now (PUT /api/news/seen). A new user starts at the registration time. /whats-new lists all entries. Editing an entry does not make it unseen again. Create, update and delete are rows in admin_audit.
• Welcome page: user_settings.welcome_seen_at is null until the user sees the welcome page; "Let's go" and "Skip" set it (PUT /api/users/settings/welcome-seen). V24 sets it for every existing user, so only users registered after the deploy get the page.
• Mails from the platform mailbox: "a new registration waits" to the admin (APP_MAIL_ADMIN_TO, with the link to the admin page), and to the user "confirm your address" (CONFIRM_EMAIL, sent first; the admin mail follows the click), then "your account is active" or "your registration was denied", later "your account is blocked" and "your account will be deleted from ", and "reset your password" (PASSWORD_RESET, the link) and "your password was changed" (PASSWORD_CHANGED, after a reset or a change). The registration sends the browser language (de for a German browser, else en), which also becomes the user's app language. Plain text only. See "Mail flow".
• Broadcast mail: a PLATFORM_ADMIN writes one mail with subject and text in English and German (plain text), and sends it to all active users or to picked ones, each in their app language. Every active user gets it. "Send test to me" mails the draft to the admin only, in the admin's language. One mail_broadcast row keeps the texts and the counts (recipients, sent, failed); BROADCAST_SEND goes to admin_audit. The sender takes account mails first and stays under APP_MAIL_DAILY_LIMIT per 24 h, 10 of them kept for account mails. A recipient who is blocked or deleted before the send counts as failed.
• Delete my account with the password (5 wrong tries per 15 minutes, then 429). It only sets users.deleted_at and revokes every refresh token: from then on no login, no refresh, no access token, no public profile, no Steam link, not in the landing stats. Email and display name stay taken; the Steam ID is freed, so an undo needs a new Steam link. A nightly job (04:15, Europe/Berlin) removes users flagged 30 days ago, in Core first and then in Auth. It calls Core's /internal/accounts/* with a service token (EdDSA JWT, 60 s, aud=tbp-internal). app.account-cleanup.dry-run (default true) only logs.

API

Method	Path	Auth
POST	/api/registration/new	public
POST	/api/registration/confirm ({token, password}; 204; 410 CONFIRMATION_INVALID)	public
POST	/api/registration/resend ({email}; always 204)	public
POST	/api/auth/login	public, sets both cookies
POST	/api/auth/password-reset ({email}; always 204; 429 TOO_MANY_ATTEMPTS: 5 per IP and 15 min)	public
POST	/api/auth/password-reset/confirm ({token, password}; 204; 410 RESET_INVALID; 429)	public
POST	/api/auth/password ({currentPassword, newPassword}; 204; 403 INVALID_PASSWORD; 429; under /api/auth for the refresh cookie, which keeps the current login)	access token
POST	/api/auth/refresh	refresh cookie, replaces both cookies
POST	/api/auth/logout	refresh cookie, clears both cookies
GET	/api/users/me	access token
PUT	/api/users/settings	access token
POST	/api/users/steam-link	access token, returns Steam's login URL and sets the binding cookie
DELETE	/api/users/steam-link	access token, removes the Steam ID and sets a new access cookie
POST	/api/auth/view-as ({role}, null = own role; new cookies; 403 ROLE_NOT_ALLOWED above the own role)	refresh cookie
GET	/api/admin/users?query=&status=&page=&size= ({content, page, size, totalElements, totalPages}; status UNCONFIRMED, PENDING, ACTIVE or DENIED, empty for all; each user has status)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
GET	/api/admin/users/pending-count ({count}: registrations that wait)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
PUT	/api/admin/users/{id}/decision ({accepted}; 204; 409 NOT_PENDING, also for an unconfirmed request)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
PUT	/api/admin/users/{id}/role ({role, expectedRole}; 204; 400 for an unknown role; 404 USER_NOT_FOUND; 409 SELF_ACTION, ACTOR_NOT_ADMIN, ROLE_CHANGED (the role is not expectedRole), ALREADY_DELETED, TARGET_IS_BLOCKED, TARGET_IS_PENDING, TARGET_IS_UNCONFIRMED)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
GET	/api/admin/users/{id}/role-changes ({results: [{actorUserId, actorEmail, oldRole, newRole, changedAt}]}, newest first, 50 at most; actorEmail null after the actor is purged)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
PUT	/api/admin/users/{id}/blocked ({blocked}; 409 SELF_ACTION, TARGET_IS_ADMIN, ALREADY_DELETED, TARGET_IS_PENDING)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
DELETE	/api/admin/users/{id} (409 SELF_ACTION, TARGET_IS_ADMIN, TARGET_IS_PENDING, TARGET_IS_UNCONFIRMED)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
DELETE	/api/admin/users/{id}/unconfirmed (hard delete of an unconfirmed request; 204; 404; 409 NOT_UNCONFIRMED, SELF_ACTION, TARGET_IS_ADMIN)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
POST	/api/admin/users/{id}/password-reset (204; 409 NOT_ACTIVE, SELF_ACTION, TARGET_IS_ADMIN)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
GET	/api/hints ({results}: running hints for this user not closed for good, newest first, with emptyLibraryOnly; automatic: keys of the automatic hints that are on and not hidden)	access token
PUT	/api/hints/auto/{key}/snooze (hide 7 days; 204; 404 HINT_NOT_FOUND)	access token
PUT	/api/hints/auto/{key}/done (hide for good; 204; 404 HINT_NOT_FOUND)	access token
PUT	/api/hints/{id}/done (204; 404 HINT_NOT_FOUND)	access token
GET	/api/admin/hints ({results} with status PLANNED/ACTIVE/ENDED by the server clock and doneCount and the target* fields, newest first; automatic: [{key, enabled}])	PLATFORM_ADMIN
POST	/api/admin/hints ({textEn, textDe, kind, startsAt, endsAt} and optional targetNoSteam, targetRole (this role and higher), targetNewDays (1-365), targetEmptyLibrary; 201 {id}, 400 INVALID_HINT for the time range; 400 VALIDATION_FAILED for a bad targetNewDays or targetRole)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
PUT	/api/admin/hints/{id}/end (204; a planned hint never starts)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
PUT	/api/admin/hints/auto/{key} ({enabled}; 204; 404 HINT_NOT_FOUND)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
GET	/api/news ({results} with seen, newest first)	access token
PUT	/api/news/seen (204)	access token
GET	/api/admin/news ({results}, newest first)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
POST	/api/admin/news ({titleEn, titleDe, textEn, textDe}; 201 {id})	PLATFORM_ADMIN
PUT	/api/admin/news/{id} (same body; 204; 404 NEWS_NOT_FOUND)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
DELETE	/api/admin/news/{id} (204; 404 NEWS_NOT_FOUND)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
DELETE	/api/users/me ({password}; 204 and both cookies cleared, 403 INVALID_PASSWORD, 409 LAST_ADMIN (the only active admin), 429)	access token
GET	/api/steam-link/callback	public, Steam's redirect back; binding cookie; redirects to the frontend settings
PUT	/api/users/settings/appearance	access token
PUT	/api/users/settings/profile-style ({accent, corners, bannerAppid, backgroundAppid}; 204)	access token
PUT	/api/users/settings/dashboard-tiles ({tiles: [{id, size}]} in order, at most 20; {tiles: null} resets; 204). Auth checks only the id shape [A-Z_]{1,30}: Core and the Frontend skip ids they do not know, and Core never shares the overview or the activity	access token
PUT	/api/users/settings/welcome-seen (204; stamps user_settings.welcome_seen_at, sent as settings.welcomeSeenAt in /me, null until then)	access token
GET	/api/admin/broadcasts ({results} with the counts, newest first)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
GET	/api/admin/broadcasts/recipient-count?userIds= ({count}; no userIds = all)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
POST	/api/admin/broadcasts ({subjectEn, subjectDe, bodyEn, bodyDe, userIds}; 201 {recipientCount}; 409 NO_RECIPIENTS)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
POST	/api/admin/broadcasts/test (same body; 204)	PLATFORM_ADMIN
PUT	/api/users/settings/favorite-platform ({platform}, free text up to 32, e.g. PS5; null clears it; 204)	access token
PUT	/api/users/settings/profile-tiles ({tiles: [{id, size}]}, e.g. SUMMARY, STATUS, PLAYING, FINISHED, STATS_<GROUP>; 204)	access token
GET	/api/public/profiles/{displayName}	public
PUT	/api/users/settings/owner-lists ({enabled}; 204; opt-in to be shown by name in owner and user lists, only together with the public profile)	access token
GET	/api/stats/users?key=TOTAL_USERS|STEAM_LINKED&page= ({listed: [{displayName}], listedTotal, privateCount, includesYou, page, totalPages}; never an id; not cached)	access token
GET	/api/stats/public	public
GET	/api/version ({commit, builtAt} of the running image, from the CI build; dev locally)	public

Endpoints use Spring's API versioning with a query parameter: ?version=1.0 (default 1.0).

Tech stack

• Java 25, Spring Boot 4.1 (Web MVC, Security, Data JPA, Validation, Cache with Caffeine), virtual threads
• PostgreSQL 17, Flyway migrations
• JJWT with Ed25519 keys
• Spring Boot Actuator + Micrometer (Prometheus)
• Tests: JUnit 5, Testcontainers (PostgreSQL), ArchUnit
• CI: Forgejo Actions, multi-stage Docker image

Architecture

Package by feature (modules/login, modules/registration, modules/user, ...), and inside each feature three layers:

Layer	Package	Rule
API	api	REST controllers, request/response records, ApiMapper. Calls services, never repositories.
Domain	model, service, exception	Plain Java models and business logic. Uses repositories, never API classes, entities or EntityMapper.
Persistence	persistence, repo	JPA entities, Spring Data repositories, EntityMapper; repo holds JdbcTemplate queries. Entities never reach the API layer.

user owns the tables users and user_settings through the one JPA entity UserEntity. login and registration read and write users with JdbcTemplate (refresh tokens stay JPA). Every query for "a user who may log in and is shown to others" uses shared/account/ActiveUser. A settings change is one UserRepository.update(userId, change): load the user, change the model, write back the display name and the settings. A new setting needs no new repository method. Three Caffeine caches in CacheConfig: users (by userId) and publicStats expire 10 minutes after the write, activeUsers (the filter's "blocked or deleted, and when did the role change?" check per request) after 30 seconds. Every write evicts what it changes. A request that read the database just before a block or delete can put the old answer back, so the short TTL is the real limit: a blocked or deleted user, or a token from before a role change, works for up to 30 s. profile and stats only read data. They have no entities and use JdbcTemplate queries in a repo package. version has only an api package: GET /api/version answers the commit and build time of the running image. account (delete and nightly cleanup) sets the flag with JdbcTemplate in a repo package too, and calls Core through CoreAccountService. admin (users page, audit) works the same way. It deletes through the port shared/account/AccountDeleter, and the login module writes "view as" to the audit table through shared/audit/AdminAuditLog, because modules never use each other. hint (dashboard hints and their admin API) uses JdbcTemplate in a repo package too, and audits through shared/audit/AdminAuditLog. news (what's new entries and their admin API) is built the same way as hint; the seen stamp is a column of user_settings, read and written by SQL in its own repo. mail writes each mail as a finished text into mail_outbox (JdbcTemplate, repo), in the transaction of the event, and MailOutboxService sends the rows every minute over SMTP. Other modules reach it through the port shared/mail/AccountMailer. Without SPRING_MAIL_HOST mail is off: the rows wait and go out once a host is set. Broadcasts (BroadcastService, mail_broadcast) queue one row per recipient; the same job sends them after the account mails and under the daily limit.

ArchUnit enforces these rules in src/test/java/auth_service/architecture/ArchitectureTest.java, so a layer violation fails the build. It also keeps the modules independent of each other and free of cycles. Test base classes (AbstractUnitTest, AbstractWebMvcTest, AbstractPersistenceTest, AbstractIntegrationTest) live in auth_service.shared.test. Integration and persistence tests share one PostgreSQL container (TestPostgres), and the base classes carry every annotation, so each kind starts one Spring context. A test with its own annotations starts another one.

Mirrored in Core. These files exist in both services with small differences; a change in one needs the same change in the other: ClientHeaderFilter, RoleAuthorizationManager, MethodSecurityConfig, Role, RequiresRole, Public (Core also has Internal), UserPrincipal, the login token check in JwtService.parseLoginToken, the ArchUnit role rules (RoleAnnotationRules) and src/test/resources/contract/auth-core-contract.json (ToBePlayed-Deployment/scripts/check-contract.sh compares the two).

Login flow

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Browser (Frontend)
    participant A as Auth
    participant C as Core
    B->>A: POST /api/auth/login
    A-->>B: Set-Cookie tbp_access (15 min), tbp_refresh (30 days, path /api/auth)
    B->>C: API call with tbp_access
    C->>A: GET /.well-known/jwks.json (new kid only)
    A-->>C: Public keys (Ed25519)
    C-->>B: 200, or 401 when the access token expired
    B->>A: POST /api/auth/refresh with tbp_refresh
    A-->>B: New tbp_access and tbp_refresh, old refresh token rotated
    B->>C: Same API call again
    Note over B,A: View as (admin only)
    B->>A: POST /api/auth/view-as {role} with tbp_refresh
    A-->>B: New tbp_access (role claim) and tbp_refresh, active role stored for this login

1. LoginService checks the password. LoginController sets both HttpOnly cookies (AuthCookies), so no script can read them.
2. Core verifies the access token with Auth's public keys only. JwksController publishes them; Core loads them again only for an unknown kid.
3. On a 401 the frontend calls POST /api/auth/refresh once and sends the request again. RefreshTokenService replaces the refresh token. A replaced token that comes back revokes the whole login.

Steam link flow

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Browser (Frontend)
    participant A as Auth
    participant S as Steam
    B->>A: POST /api/users/steam-link (logged in)
    A-->>B: Steam login URL, Set-Cookie tbp_steam_link (state, 10 min)
    B->>S: Sign in on steamcommunity.com
    S-->>B: Redirect to /api/steam-link/callback?state=...&openid.*
    B->>A: GET callback with tbp_steam_link
    A->>S: check_authentication (openid.* sent back)
    S-->>A: is_valid:true
    A-->>B: Redirect to /settings?steam=linked
    B->>A: POST /api/auth/refresh (new steamId claim for Core)

SteamLinkService checks the state against the binding cookie before it asks Steam anything, and uses each state once. SteamOpenIdService checks mode, endpoint, return_to and the signed fields, then asks Steam. UserService.linkVerifiedSteamId stores the ID and takes it from an account that only typed it in.

Delete account flow

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Browser (Frontend)
    participant A as Auth
    participant C as Core
    B->>A: DELETE /api/users/me {password}
    A->>A: users.deleted_at = now, revoke refresh tokens, mail row (one transaction)
    A->>C: POST /internal/accounts/deleted (service token)
    A-->>B: 204, both cookies cleared
    Note over A: an old access token gets 401 within 30 s (activeUsers cache)
    Note over A,C: nightly 04:15
    A->>C: PUT /internal/accounts/deleted (all flagged users)
    A->>C: PUT /internal/accounts/states (every user)
    A->>C: POST /internal/accounts/purge (flagged 30+ days)
    A->>A: DELETE users (only when Core answered and no dry run)
    A->>C: POST /internal/accounts/prune (all user ids)

A failed call to Core does not fail the delete: the next night sends the whole flagged set again. Undo within 30 days is UPDATE users SET deleted_at = NULL (see the Deployment README).

Mail flow

Each mail is a row in mail_outbox, written in the transaction of its event, so the event never fails because of the mail server and no mail is lost when Auth restarts. The text is rendered then, in the user's language (de, else English); the admin mail is German.

sequenceDiagram
    participant B as Browser (Frontend)
    participant A as Auth
    participant M as SMTP (Hostinger)
    B->>A: admin sends a broadcast
    A->>A: mail_broadcast row + one outbox row per active user
    B->>A: register / admin decides / admin blocks / delete account
    A->>A: event + mail_outbox row (PENDING), one transaction
    loop every minute (MailOutboxService)
        A->>M: up to 20 due rows (account mails first, at most APP_MAIL_DAILY_LIMIT per 24 h, broadcast rows keep 10 free)
        M-->>A: ok: SENT / error: try again after 1, 2, 4 ... 60 min
    end
    Note over A: after 10 tries FAILED and a warning in the log; SENT rows are removed after 30 days

Registration flow

A registration is a request: the account is UNCONFIRMED until the address owner opens the link in the mail (24 hours, single use, only its SHA-256 is stored; a resend replaces it) and chooses the password there, then PENDING until a PLATFORM_ADMIN decides. The registration form has no password: an unconfirmed user has none and cannot log in (login answers the same 401 as for an unknown address), so nobody can set the password of an address that is not theirs. The admin list shows an unconfirmed request as such; it cannot be accepted, the admin can delete it for good. The badge counts PENDING only and the admin mail follows the confirmation. The nightly cleanup deletes it after 7 days (not while a resent link is still valid), also in dry run. Registering again with an unconfirmed address is a resend: a new link, no second row. At most 3 confirmation mails per address and hour (over all IPs, registration and resend together); over that the answer stays the same and no mail is sent. Unconfirmed requests count toward the 20 that wait. While 20 wait, the registration answers 409 PENDING_LIMIT_REACHED and stores nothing. Two requests at the same moment can make it 21.

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as New user
    participant A as Auth
    participant D as Admin
    U->>A: POST /api/registration/new
    A->>A: users.status = UNCONFIRMED, one mail row
    A-->>U: mail "confirm your address" (link)
    U->>A: POST /api/registration/confirm {token, password}
    A->>A: users.status = PENDING, password hash stored
    A-->>D: mail "a new registration waits"
    U->>A: login: 403 ACCOUNT_PENDING
    Note over A: nightly: UNCONFIRMED older than 7 days is deleted
    D->>A: PUT /api/admin/users/{id}/decision {accepted}
    alt accepted
        A->>A: status = ACTIVE
        A-->>U: mail "your account is active"
    else denied
        A->>A: status = DENIED, deleted_at = now (nightly cleanup after 30 days)
        A-->>U: mail "your registration was denied"
    end

Password reset flow

The link is valid for 1 hour and works once: the reset is one UPDATE ... WHERE password_reset_hash = ? AND expires > now AND <active> that also clears the hash. At most 3 reset mails per address and hour (over all IPs) and 5 requests per IP per 15 minutes; failed confirms are limited to 10 per IP. Other logins keep their access token until it expires (up to 15 minutes); their refresh tokens end at once.

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as User
    participant A as Auth
    participant D as Admin
    U->>A: POST /api/auth/password-reset {email}
    A->>A: active user: store token hash + expiry, one mail row
    A-->>U: 204 (same for any address)
    A-->>U: mail "reset your password" (link with token)
    U->>A: POST /api/auth/password-reset/confirm {token, password}
    A->>A: new password, hash cleared, all refresh tokens revoked
    A-->>U: 204 and mail "your password was changed"
    Note over D,A: POST /api/admin/users/{id}/password-reset sends the same mail (active users only) and writes the audit log

Steam ID and block sync to Core

Core keeps its own copy of the Steam ID and of the block. After a verified Steam link (also for the account that loses a typed-in ID), an unlink, a block and an unblock, Auth sends the user's state after the commit (AccountStatePublisher), also when the display name, the public profile or "show me in owner lists" changes; the nightly cleanup sends every user. A change of the profile tiles sends it too. The state carries listed (active, public profile, opt-in and a display name: ListedUser), which Core uses for its owner lists, publicProfile (active, public profile and a display name: PublicUser) and profileSections (the profile parts the user shows, by the names of the profile ticket: ProfileSections), which Core uses to let others follow the user and to leave out in the follower note what the profile hides (#27). The call runs on the task executor, so neither the answer nor a database connection waits for Core; a failed call is tried again after 10 s, 1 min and 5 min (in memory), then it only warns.

sequenceDiagram
    participant A as Auth
    participant C as Core
    A->>A: link / unlink / block / unblock / name change (commit)
    A->>C: POST /internal/accounts/states {userId, steamId, displayName, blocked, roleChangedAt, listed, publicProfile, profileSections}
    C->>C: blocked_user, listed_user, public_user (+ sections), account_role_change, Steam ID in user_steam_sync, display name in account_name
    Note over A,C: nightly 04:15
    A->>C: PUT /internal/accounts/states (every user)

Run locally

Local development without keys (profile local)

The whole stack runs on your machine with no API keys and no calls to Steam, Twitch/IGDB or speedrun.com. Needs Java 25, Node 24 and Docker. Clone ToBePlayed-Auth, ToBePlayed-Core and ToBePlayed-Frontend next to each other, then start them in this order (Core also starts without Auth and finds it later):

1. Auth: in ToBePlayed-Auth, ./mvnw spring-boot:run -Dspring-boot.run.profiles=local (IDE: active profile local). Port 8080.
2. Core: in ToBePlayed-Core, ./mvnw spring-boot:run -Dspring-boot.run.profiles=local. Port 8090.
3. Frontend: in ToBePlayed-Frontend, npm install, then npm run dev, and open http://localhost:5173 (localhost, not 127.0.0.1, so the browser sends the login cookies to every local port). The development values must be VITE_API_URL=http://localhost:8080 and VITE_CORE_API_URL=http://localhost:8090.
4. Log in with dev@localhost / password123. On the dashboard, start a Steam sync: the library fills with 8 games, achievements, time to beat, moods, a wishlist and one speedrun game from recorded answers.

In Auth, local makes a new signing key at each start (LocalKeysEnvironmentPostProcessor, only in this profile, and never together with prod), so no key is in the repo; after an Auth restart (also a devtools restart), log in again. Never use local on a server: the dev user's password is public. The Flyway callback in db/local adds the dev user (PLATFORM_ADMIN, linked Steam ID). A new local user waits until the dev user accepts it on the admin page. What Core mocks and how to change the recorded answers: Core readme, "Run locally".

With your own keys (profile dev)

Needs Java 25, Docker and your own keys.

./mvnw spring-boot:run -Dspring-boot.run.profiles=dev

Spring Boot's Docker Compose support starts PostgreSQL from compose.yaml, Flyway applies the migrations, and the service listens on http://localhost:8080. Health: /actuator/health (the only open actuator endpoint).

The cookies are host-only unless APP_AUTH_COOKIE_DOMAIN is set; production sets it to the parent domain, so Core gets the access cookie too. Browsers accept Secure cookies on http://localhost, so local development needs no cookie settings. Open the frontend on localhost (not 127.0.0.1), so the browser sends the cookies to every local port.

Configuration comes from environment variables:

Variable	Purpose
JWT_PRIVATE_KEY, JWT_PUBLIC_KEY	Ed25519 keypair, Base64 of the DER bytes (PKCS#8 / X.509)
JWT_KID	Key id written into the token header
DB_PASSWORD	Local PostgreSQL password
APP_PUBLIC_URL	Auth's public address, the Steam OpenID realm (default http://localhost:8080)
APP_FRONTEND_URL	Where the Steam link ends (default http://localhost:5173)
APP_CORE_INTERNAL_URL	Core for the nightly account cleanup, required (local http://localhost:8090, Docker http://tbp-core-service:8090)
SPRING_MAIL_HOST, SPRING_MAIL_USERNAME, SPRING_MAIL_PASSWORD	SMTP server and its login (port 465, SSL). No host = mail off
APP_MAIL_FROM	Sender address, the mailbox of the SMTP login. Needed with a host
APP_MAIL_ADMIN_TO	Gets "a new registration waits". Needed with a host
APP_MAIL_DAILY_LIMIT	Mails per rolling 24 h, all kinds together (default 100, Hostinger's free mailbox; 1000 Business Starter, 3000 Business Standard / Premium). Broadcast rows keep 10 free

Generate a keypair:

openssl genpkey -algorithm ed25519 -out private.pem
openssl pkey -in private.pem -outform DER | base64 -w0   # JWT_PRIVATE_KEY
openssl pkey -in private.pem -pubout -outform DER | base64 -w0   # JWT_PUBLIC_KEY

Tests

./mvnw clean verify

Runs unit, WebMvc, persistence and integration tests plus the ArchUnit rules. Needs Docker for Testcontainers.

Roadmap

See ROADMAP.md in the ToBePlayed-Deployment repo.

License

All rights reserved. The source is public for reading only.